We propose the Anticipation and Recall model, an integrative theoretical framework that predicts the temporal profiles of instant utility experienced before, during, and after a given event. Total utility is calculated as the sum integral of instant utility. At a process level, the model captures several psychological principles such as conceptual consumption, adaptation, and time distance. The model offers numerous predictions and implications. The profile of instant utility is U-shaped during anticipation. Shortening anticipation makes a positive event more surprising and leads to an increase in utility from recall. Under certain conditions, surprises are optimal, in the sense that zero anticipation maximizes total utility. We investigate the case of anticipating negative events, and provide prescription on how individuals may better cope with negative situations. The model also provides insight into optimal hedonic editing and deceptive postponement. Empirical evidence in favor of the main implications of the model is discussed.
Introduction
"If for example you come at four o'clock in the afternoon, I shall start feeling happy at three o'clock. As the time passes, I shall feel happier and happier. At four o'clock, I shall become agitated and start worrying; I shall discover the price of happiness. But if you come at just any time, I shall never know when I should prepare my heart to greet you... One must observe certain rites." -The Little Prince, Antoine de Saint-Exupery, 1943.
The Little Prince exhorts the fox to let him know the exact arrival time of her visit because he does not want to miss the anticipatory feelings of happiness and excitement prior to the upcoming meeting. Indeed, there are many events whose duration is very short relative to the duration of anticipation and recall. Examples include admiring a beautiful building or natural wonder, a visit by a distant friend or relative, a brief romantic encounter, a short but painful medical procedure, or meeting a celebrity. Lazarus (1966) demonstrated that certain forms of physical pain, such as pinpricks, do not produce measurable psychological-stress reactions beyond those produced by the mere anticipation of them. Two studies that examined travelers' experiences found that, regardless of the type of trip, vacationers were happier in the period leading up to their vacation than during the vacation (Nawijn et al., 2010; Mitchell et al., 1997) . In such cases, the sum integral of the utility experienced during the occurrence of the event may be small compared to the total utility derived from the event, that is, considering the utility derived before (anticipation), during (occurrence), and after (recall) the event. Bentham (1789) was among the first to recognize that anticipation is an important source of pleasure and pain. Jevons (1913) later distinguished between anticipation of future events, sensation of present events, and memory of past events. Kahneman et al. (1997, p. 376) argue that "Total utility is a normative concept constructed from temporal profiles of instant utility."
Existing research, however, has not proposed a comprehensive model of instant utility during anticipation, occurrence, and recall. In this paper, we propose the An-ticipation Recall model (AR model), formally linking the three components of total utility on a continuous time interval that includes the occurrence of the event, as well as the time during which it is anticipated and recalled.
The AR model is based on well-established psychological principles, such as conceptual consumption, adaptation, and time distance. Given a small set of general inputs (i.e., the magnitude and duration of the event, and the duration of anticipation and recall), the AR model produces a temporal profile of instant utility associated with an event. The sum integral of instant utility over time produces the total utility associated with the event.
According to Kahneman et al. (1997) , a rational individual will seek to maximize total utility.
Conceptual Consumption, Adaptation, and Time Distance
The process model we propose entails three key psychological elements. The first element is conceptual consumption (Ariely & Norton, 2009 ), defined as psychological consumption that can occur independent of physical consumption. Anticipatory emotions arise in reaction to mental discrete images of the outcome of a decision (Damasio, 1994) . For example, when anticipating a future, upcoming event, individuals are conceptually consuming images of the event prior to its physical occurrence. The ability to generate such mental simulations is a fundamental ability of the human mind (Gilbert & Wilson, 2007) . Conceptual consumption produces "savoring" and "dread" during anticipation (G. Loewenstein, 1987; Golub et al., 2009) . Similarly for recall, contemplation of the past through memory produces pleasure or pain in the present (Elster & Loewenstein, 1992) .
People recall salient instants of pleasure or pain and tend to neglect the duration of the event (Kahneman et al., 1993; Fredrickson & Kahneman, 1993; Fredrickson, 2000) . Consistent with this research, we posit that mental images of future events (Elster & Loewenstein, 1992) , or "snapshots" of the event experienced in the past (Fredrickson & Kahneman, 1993) , determine the intensity of conceptual consumption before and after the physical occurrence of the event.
The second psychological element is adaptation before and during the event. Adaptation, which is understood as a decreased response to a repeated stimuli, has been part of the toolset of psychologists for a long time (Helson, 1964) . In formal utility models, adaptation is often described by means of a reference point that approaches the consumption rate (Wathieu, 1997; Baucells & Sarin, 2010) . We posit that not only consumption during the event, but also conceptual consumption before the event, produces adaptation. Anticipating an event increases the level of expectations against which future outcomes will be valued (Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Olson et al., 1996) . Formally, anticipation modifies the reference point (Kőszegi & Rabin, 2006; Kőszegi & Rabin, 2009 ). Thus, overly optimistic expectations hold the potential for lowering the utility from the event by setting high counterfactuals (Shepperd & McNulty, 2002) .
Indeed extensive research demonstrates that unmet anticipatory expectations produce disappointment in a variety of settings, such as romantic dates (Norton et al., 2007) , athletic competitions (Medvec et al., 1995) , promotions in the work place (Harvey & Martinko, 2009 ), academic tests (Shepperd & McNulty, 2002) , and hotel services (Boulding et al., 1993) . People typically use a recollection of similar events, which occurred in the past and are stored in their memory, to form their expectations of upcoming events (Weber et al., 2007; Stewart et al., 2006) and to set the reference point against which future outcomes will be measured (Anderson & Milson, 1989) .
Thus stored past experiences shape the upper and lower limits of the range of comparisons, which in turn influence the pleasure one gets from any given event (Elster & Loewenstein, 1992, p.217 ).
The third psychological element of the AR model is time distance to the event. Time distance modulates instant utility during anticipation and recall by means of a discount factor. The discount factor is not a function of the calendar time. Instead, it depends on the time distance to and from the event. Discounting captures the notions of decreasing impatience for anticipation (G. F. Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993; Frederick et al., 2002) and of transience for recall (Ebbinghaus, 1913; Wixted, 2004; Brown et al., 2007) . We also incorporate magnitude effects in discounting: the smaller the magnitude of the event, the smaller the discount factor (R. Thaler, 1981; Frederick et al., 2002) . This feature captures the "peak" element of the peak-end rule (Kahneman et al., 1993; Fredrickson, 2000) . Time distance, together with conceptual consumption, is consistent with construal level theory, which proposes that individuals form abstract mental construals of distal objects and realities (Trope & Liberman, 2010) , and derive pleasure or pain from these thoughts. We set our model under conditions of certainty and focus on the described psychological elements of conceptual consumption, hedonic adaptation, and time distance. Thus, we effectively contribute to the literature by modeling the combined effect of these three elements in a unique and comprehensive formulation. As detailed in the description of the model, we capture these elements using a parametric specification (see Table D1 below).
Review of Anticipatory Utility Models
Many formal models of anticipation have been proposed. Existing models of anticipation are typically set in discrete time and propose general functional forms by which future outcomes and events affect current utility.
In the seminal paper by G. Loewenstein (1987) , individuals derive utility from anticipation, and such utility is proportional to the total future utility that will be obtained during the event. In Brunnermeier & Parker (2005) and Gollier & Muermann (2010) , agents derive utility from being optimistic, and choose expectations (probabilities) in order to optimally trade-off optimism with poor decision-making (associated with having wrong probabilities) and regret (Bell, 1982) . As models of anticipation, these papers assume the same formulation as G. Loewenstein (1987) . Kőszegi & Rabin (2009) propose a model of anticipation by which individuals derive consumption utility during the event plus gain/loss utility before the event.
Gain/loss utility is driven by changes in expectations, and it is updated immediately when these changes occur.
When applied to the context of the AR model, individuals would obtain a boost of utility at the moment they plan for an upcoming event (gain/loss utility), a second boost of utility at the moment of consuming, and no utility in between. Our focus is on gradual adaptation, i.e., on how this initial surprise is savored over time. Caplin & Leahy (2001) propose a modification of expected utility whereby utility is obtained from psychological states, rather than physical outcomes. These psychological states depend on the current and future physical outcomes, and hence produce anticipatory feelings such as anxiety. Caplin & Leahy (2001) and similar economic models abstract from specific details. For example, discrete-time models of anticipation may introduce a parameter or a state called the anticipation level. However, little detail is given on what determines the anticipation level or the mechanism through which the anticipa-tion level affects the utility of the event. There is a need for a model focused more on psychology, which explicitly maps physical outcomes to psychological states, and provides sufficient detail to derive the temporal profile of experienced utility.
This paper aims to fill this gap. To keep things simple, we focus on conditions of certainty, and on single event cases (e.g., an upcoming dinner at a nice restaurant that is expected to occur with certainty). Departing from existing models, our setup uses continuous time. This is an important modeling choice because it forces us to confront questions on how anticipation might work. For instance, how does utility of anticipation exactly evolve over time? How does the precise duration of anticipation affect the utility of the event?
By virtue of its richer formulation capturing diverse elements (e.g., adaptation during anticipation, magnitude effects in discounting), the AR model produces a wide set of insights and testable implications. For example, consistent with Breznitz (1984) , the resulting profile of instant utility during anticipation is U-shaped. In examining total utility, we find that increasing anticipation makes the event less surprising and leads to an decreases in the utility experienced during and after the event. Thus, there is such a thing as the optimal duration of anticipation. In fact, we identify conditions under which a surprise event (i.e., zero anticipation) is optimal.
We also investigate how to optimally anticipate negative events. Finally, the model provides insight into optimal hedonic editing and deceptive postponement. We test some of the predictions of the AR model with participants in the lab and provide supporting empirical evidence. Full details of each study are reported in the paper appendix.
The Anticipation-Recall
Model

The General Model
Let t denote continuous calendar time. Four moments are relevant: the moment the event starts to be anticipated, t 0 , the moment the event begins, t b , the moment the event ends, t e , and the moment the recall of the event ends, T . We assume t 0 ≤ t b ≤ t e ≤ T . Thus, the event is anticipated during [t 0 , t b ), it takes place during [t b , t e ), and it is recalled during [t e , T ). Let ∆ a = t b − t 0 be the duration of anticipation and ∆ e = t e − t b the duration of the event. Unless stated otherwise, we conveniently set
Events, such as a concert or a minor surgery, can influence utility first through savoring or dread, then through the unfolding of the experience, and finally through memory (Elster & Loewenstein, 1992 ). In our model, the full consumption profile associated with the event consists of a rate that extends over time c t , t 0 ≤ t < T . This is a rate of physical consumption while the event is taking place and a rate of conceptual consumption during anticipation and recall (Ariely & Norton, 2009) . For pleasurable events (e.g., a dinner out), physical consumption is positive; for painful events (e.g., a surgical procedure), physical consumption is negative. For t b ≤ t < t e , the value of c t may be a function of the objective attributes of the event (quantity, quality, etc.). For example, consider an individual making a reservation at a high-quality restaurant for the following week. Because the restaurant is high-scale (better wine, better ambience, more elaborate menu), the consumption rate during the event will be higher (e.g., around 80 out of an imaginary 100 points scale) than if the reservation had been for a fast-food restaurant (e.g., around 30 out of 100).
Given a rate of consumption during the event, c t , t b ≤ t < t e , conceptual consumption before and after the event is composed of samples of snapshots of c t during the event. In other words, the model disallows setting conceptual consumption to levels that are impossible to attain in reality (one is required to buy the lottery ticket in order to gain the right to imagine that one might be millionaire). Formally, the level of conceptual consumption at any point in time during anticipation and recall is a decision variable constrained to take values in C = {c t : t b ≤ t < t e }, the range of event consumption.
For simplicity, we will assume that consumption is constant throughout the event. In the example, this means that c t = 80 during the dinner. Because C = {80}, the rate of conceptual consumption during anticipation and recall will be 80 as well.
There is a reference point, r t , t ≥ t 0 . Given c t , t ≥ t 0 , the reference point adapts to c t (i.e., approaches c t ) during the anticipation phase and during the event. Because the reference point is determined by the level of conceptual consumption, which is a deterministic choice variable, the reference point at every point in time is a deterministic value. 1 The carrier of utility is given by the difference between the consumption rate, c t , and the reference point, r t , by means of a value function v(c t − r t ) (Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Wathieu, 1997) . A value function, v : R → R is any strictly increasing function with v(0) = 0 (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) . It is a ratio-scale function, that is, unique up to multiplication by a positive scalar. We label the difference c t − r t the effective consumption ( Figure C1 ). Continuing with our restaurant example, in the week prior to the dinner, the individual will savor the upcoming dinner by having thoughts of a savory entree in a nice setting. Engaging in such conceptual consumption will progressively elevate the reference point for the upcoming dinner toward the specific level of conceptual consumption (e.g., towards 80 in the case of the high-scale dinner). Thus, when the dinner finally occurs, the effective consumption rate will be determined by the level of conceptual consumption minus the reference point developed during anticipation.
[ Figure 1 about here.] Finally, there is time distance and discounting. Following Baucells & Heukamp (2012) , time distance is defined as calendar distance multiplied by a discount rate.
Let ρ a , ρ r > 0 be the discount rates for anticipation and recall, respectively. Given discount rates, the time distance, τ t , to and from the event is given by
Discounting is a decreasing function of time distance, and given by f (τ t ) = e −π(τ t ) , where π : With these three elements in mind, we are ready to define the AR model. 
and total utility (of anticipation, of the event, and of recall, respectively), is given by
We interpret u(t) = 0 as a neutral state, and u(t) > 0 (u(t) < 0) as instants in which the individual is in a positive (negative) state. Considering the absolute value of instant utility, we call |u(t)| the instant (dis)utility at time t, and |U| the total (dis)utility.
Assumptions
In order to produce a relatively tractable model and derive insights, we make five specific assumptions, which we later discuss.
A1
. Constant consumption rate. Let c ∈ R be the consumption level. We set c t = c, t b ≤ t < t e . We call the absolute value of c, |c|, the magnitude of the event.
A2. Reference point. Let α ≥ 0 be the speed of adaptation. Given c t , t 0 ≤ t < T , we set r 0 = 0, r t = α(c t − r t ), t 0 ≤ t < t e ; and r t = r t e for t ≥ t e . 
A5. Discount factor. To capture diminishing sensitivity to time distance, we assume that π(τ) is a concave function. We consider two specific forms. Both involve δ ∈ (0, 1], the sensitivity to time distance.
The associated discount factors are f (τ) = e
and f (τ) = e δ−1 e −δτ , respectively.
[ Table D1 ). The different elements can be activated at will. For example, setting α = 0 turns off adaptation; setting λ = 1 eliminates loss aversion; setting δ = 1 produces exponential discounting; and setting µ = 0 eliminates the magnitude effect in discounting.
Such choices would result in a continuous-time version of G. Loewenstein (1987) .
Discussion of the Assumptions
A1. The rate of consumption during the event is assumed to be constant, as in G. Loewenstein (1987) .
This automatically implies that C = {c}, and therefore the level of conceptual consumption before and after the event are equal to c as well. In this simple setup, the anticipation of the event matches the reality of the event, and so does the recall of it.
Hence, the complex problem of choosing appropriate levels of conceptual consumption is made trivial. We do so in purpose to focus our analysis on other aspects of the model.
A2.
A reference point that gradually adapts to consumption is standard in modeling habit formation and consumer preferences (Constantinides, 1990; Wathieu, 1997; Mazumdar et al., 2005; Rozen, 2010) . Our model is the first to consider a gradual process of adaptation before the event. A1-A2
yield the convenient expression c t − r t = ce −α(t−t 0 ) , t 0 ≤ t < t e ; and c t − r t = ce −α(t e −t 0 ) , t ≥ t e . and relief upon cancellation of a negative event (false alarm). For auctions, Heyman et al. (2004) provide evidence of quasi-endowment: bidders develop a partial ownership for objects during an auction, even though they are not the owners yet.
Once the idea of possessing an item is set in the minds of bidders, not having the item is perceived as a loss. Thus, adaptation during anticipation is a realistic assumption.
A3.
We use the simplest value function that captures loss aversion. All of our results generalize to the case of a S-shaped value function with a power form (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) . Because no additional insights are obtained, we keep a simple piecewise linear form.
A4. Empirical measurements of discount rates consis-
tently show that larger amounts are discounted less than smaller amounts (R. Thaler, 1981; Frederick et al., 2002 ). The AR model captures magnitude effects by having the discount rates be a decreasing function of |c|. Moreover, the denominator of ρ r depends on the "peak" value of the event, max t∈[t b ,t e ] |v(c t − r t )|. This is consistent with the "peak" part of the peak-end rule (Kahneman et al., 1993; Fredrickson, 2000) , by which recall of experiences is greatly influenced by the peak moments, either good or bad, that stood out regardless of how long the experience lasted. This is a novel and distinctive feature of the model. Specifically, under A1-A4 and µ > 0,
Due to adaptation, discount rates for recall will be higher than for anticipation (indeed, ρ r = ρ a e αµ∆ a ).
This aligns with research suggesting that people 3 The fact that r t during recall remains constant at r te provides tractability and captures the "end" part of the peak-end rule (Kahneman et al., 1993) .
experience a "wrinkle in time," such that future events are valued more than equivalent events in the equidistant past (Caruso et al., 2008) . Note also that, due to loss aversion, negative events will be discounted less than positive events. This is consistent with the prevalent finding that gains are discounted at a higher rate than losses (Frederick et al., 2002) .
A5
. Because π(τ) is concave, the discount factor decays rapidly near τ = 0, and the decay rate slows down when τ is large. This agrees with observed patterns of decreasing impatience before the event (G. F. Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993; Frederick et al., 2002 ) and transience in recall, i.e., most forgetting occurs during early delays, and slows at later delays (Ebbinghaus, 1913; Wixted, 2004; Brown et al., 2007) .
The specific power form A5.1 was proposed by 
The Shape of Temporal Profiles of Instant utility
Under A1-A5, the profile of instant utility is given by
Note that the magnitude of the event has a direct influence through the term v(c), and an indirect effect through ρ a and ρ r , as given in (3 If the psychological distance function, π, is strictly concave, then t 0 < t m < t b under general conditions and instant utility during anticipation is U-shaped. 4 Assum-4 To find t m we solve for u (t) = 0, t 0 ≤ t < t b , where
π is decreasing and π (0 + ) > α/ρ a , then there is a unique solu-
then |u(t)| during anticipation is strictly increasing if δρ a > α, constant if δρ a = α, and strictly decreasing if δρ a < α.
ing A5.1, for example, we find that instant (dis)utility during anticipation takes its minimum at
Previous theoretical models of anticipation predict only the increasing portion of the U-shape (G. Loewenstein, 1987 ). The AR model allows for individuals to get very excited when they first learn about an upcoming event, such as a concert or a holiday. The excitement then decays, but is rekindled when the event draws near. Breznitz (1984) suggests that once an individual is fully aware of an upcoming threat, the time path of anxiety tends to be U-shaped. There is intense fear when an individual is first informed of an upcoming threat. This fear then diminishes before rising sharply in anticipation of the impact closer to the event. Proposition 1 is consistent with this pattern, as the U-shape profile is predicted for both positive and negative events.
We experimentally test the proposition that the temporal profile of instant utility during anticipation may be Ushaped. In our Study 1 (see Appendix for details), participants were asked to imagine an upcoming birthday party and to rate how excited they expected to be in the anticipation of the event. Specifically, respondents predicted their excitement at three points in time: on the day when they were first told about the event, a month before the event, and the day before the event. The answers, on a 7-point scale, were 5.2, 4.0, and 5.7, respectively. The U-shaped pattern is statistically significant (5.2 > 4.0, p < 0.001; 4.0 < 5.7, p < 0.001). As predicted by Proposition 1, the participants' enthusiasm is a U-shaped function of time.
Total Utility
To obtain total utility, we integrate instant utility over time. We obtain a tractable expression by integrating with respect to time distance. Let Σ = T 0 f (τ)dτ be the coefficient of recall.
5
Proposition 2 Under A1-A5, total utility is given by
In this section, our focus will be on the effect of c on U. The next two sections will consider the effect of ∆ e and ∆ a , respectively.
If the discount rates, ρ a and ρ r , are independent of c (i.e., µ = 0), then the term in brackets does not depend on c. This implies that total utility of consumption is proportional to v(c). In other words, the rest of complexitiesadaptation, discounting, duration of the anticipation and of the event-just modify the value function by means of a constant of proportionality (Baucells & Sarin, 2007) .
This produces the convenient results that the ratio scale function v(c) is a valid proxy for the total utility from the event.
Recall that c may be a function of the attributes of the events (e.g., quantity). Assume, as usual, that such a function is concave. If µ = 0, then the total utility will also be a concave function of the attribute of the events.
As is standard in micro-economic analysis, this will lead individuals to seek variety and diversify their resources of time and money throughout multiple experiences of moderate cost (Mas-Colell et al., 1995) .
Anticipation, Event, and Recall
If the discount rates depend on c (i.e., µ > 0), then the details of the event must be considered when calculating the functional relationship between U and c. Note that increasing |c| has a double effect: it increases |v(c)|
and it lowers the discount rates. The utility during the even, which is not affected by discounting, remains proportional to |c| (elasticity equal to one). If µ > 0, then the utility of anticipation and recall is convex in |c| (elasticity greater than one).
Proposition 3 Assume A1-A5. The elasticity of |U| A , |U| E , and |U| R with respect to |c| is given by (1 + µψ), 1, and (1 + µ), respectively, where g τ = e α ρa τ−π(τ) and
Assume µ > 0 and ∆ a > 0. For |c| small, the discount rates for anticipation and recall are very high, leading to |U| ≈ |U| E , which is linear in |c|. As |c| increases, the discount rate for anticipation, ρ a , decreases and utility of anticipation takes a more prominent role. The analysis of total utility of anticipation reveals that |U| A will be close to linear for small values of |c|, convex for intermediate values of |c|, and approach linearity for large values of |c|. 6 As |c| further increasing, the discount rates for recall, ρ r , decrease as well and recall becomes more prominent. In fact, because 1 + µ > 1, total utility of recall is convex with |c| (large events might be more than twice as memorable as events half the size). Because for large |c| both |U| A and |U| E have a linear effect, whereas |U| R is convex, we conclude that |U| R will necessarily be the largest component of |U| as |c| takes large values.
[ Figure 3 about here.] In Figure C3 , we illustrate the effect of the level of consumption on total utility. For small experiences (e.g., eating ice cream), most utility will be event utility. For intermediate experiences (e.g., a weekend outing), anticipation will play a key role. For large experiences (e.g., a honeymoon), the model predicts most of utility will be derived from recall. 
Hedonic Editing
The shape of U as a function of |c| also has implications for hedonic editing, understood as the strategic aggregation or desegregation of gains and losses. Hedonic . (1993) demonstrate that the intensity of recall is insensitive to the duration of the event, for which they coin the term "duration neglect." The AR model captures the notion of "duration neglect" in a very strong sense. The model predicts that, due to adaptation, extending the duration of the event actually lowers the intensity of recall.
Proposition 4 Increasing the duration of the event, ∆ e , has no effect on the (dis)utility of anticipation, increases the (dis)utility of the event, and strictly decreases the (dis)utility of recall. Total (dis)utility decreases with ∆ e if and only if αΣ ≥ ρ r .
Do people agree with the notion that extending an experience, through repetition, might lower the utility of recall? In Study 2 (see appendix for details), we asked participants whether they would consider it more memorable to kiss their favorite movie star only once (i.e., one time) or once daily for one week (i.e., seven times).
Sixty-eight percent of respondents selected the single time over the seven times (χ 2 = 18.2, p < 0.001), giving it a higher score on a 7-point scale (6.4 vs. 5.5, p <
0.001).
According to Proposition 4, the optimal value of ∆ e , assuming we preserve the integrity of the experience, is either zero or infinite. In practice, ∆ e can be increased by repeating the experience multiple times, as, for example, by dining out regularly. Conversely, ∆ e can be shortened by avoiding repetition (e.g., one-time experiences such as a special trip, or a very romantic encounter). The inequality αΣ ≥ ρ r produces a clear dichotomy between events that are best experienced just once and those that are best to experience repeatedly.
Contributors to having one-time experiences are the factors that increase the utility of recall: high speed of adaptation, high coefficient of recall, and low discounting for recall. If µ > 0, then ρ r decreases with c and increases with ∆ a . One-time experiences will most likely be events of large magnitude. Also, it may be optimal for one-time experiences to be surprises or to have shorter anticipation phases.
Zauberman et al. (2008) find that, when people truly enjoy an experience, they forgo ever repeating it. 8 The authors suggest such aversion is driven by a desire to protect the memory of the event from future experiences that might not be as pleasurable. The AR model rationalizes this highly psychological process.
Duration of Anticipation
In this section, we focus on the effect of ∆ a on total utility. Decision-making research has documented that total utility may increase given more time to savor anticipation (G. Loewenstein, 1987; Nowlis et al., 2004 ).
There might be, however, an optimal duration of anticipation. In an experiment entailing real consumption of chocolate, Chan & Mukhopadhyay (2010) found that participants who had to wait one week before consumption evaluated the chocolate more highly than those who were given the chocolate immediately as well as those who were given it after delays of two and four weeks.
In some cases, decision makers have some discretion over the duration of anticipation. If t 0 is known and fixed, then we vary t b (e.g., by choosing the date of the event).
If t b is fixed, then we vary t 0 (e.g., by choosing the date at which to start planning for a holiday trip or deciding how long in advance to release news about an upcoming event ) . In what follows, we set the duration of anticipation as a decision variable and seek to find its ideal length.
The effect of ∆ a on instant utility and total utility is three-fold. First, a positive duration effect: ∆ a increases the interval over which anticipation is experienced. Second, a negative adaptation effect: ∆ a reduces utility by a factor e −α∆ a . Third, a negative magnitude effect: ∆ a increases the discount rate for recall, ρ r , and reduces the utility of recall. Under A1-A5,
Clearly, both |U| E and |U| R are decreasing with ∆ a . The effect of ∆ a on |U| A is mixed: as Figure C4 (right) shows, when ∆ a increases, instant utility lasts longer, but adaptation reduces the average instant utility.
[ Figure 4 about here.] Figure C4 (left) illustrates the effect of ∆ a on total utility.
In the figure, both U and U A are unimodal (only U A is guaranteed to be so in general). We now show that the duration of anticipation that maximizes U is shorter than the duration of anticipation that maximizes U A .
Proposition 5 Assume A1-A5, α > 0 and c > 0. Let
Utility of anticipation, U A , is a unimodal function of ∆ a , reaching the peak at some 0 < ∆ A < ∞ that solves G(∆) = 0. Moreover, if −τπ τ /π τ < 1, then ∆ A strictly decreases with α and ρ 0 and increases with c.
Total Utility, U, is maximized at some value, ∆ * < ∆ A .
Specifically, if ∂U/∂∆ a | ∆ a =0 ≤ 0, then ∆ * = 0; otherwise,
Moreover, there is aμ > 0 such that if 0 ≤ µ <μ then ∆ * is unique.
We conclude this section by providing an analytic solution for the constant-sensitivity case. Appendix for details). We told participants to assume that all outcomes were certain to occur at the designated time. We also instructed them to ignore organizational issues (e.g. no booking or reservation issues). We then asked respondents to indicate how long in advance they would like to be told about each event.
Participants have an intuition about the ideal date to begin anticipating an upcoming event depending on the event itself. For example, most participants said they wanted to start anticipating the "wedding of their best friend" six months before; the "concert of their favorite band" one month before; or a "dinner in a fancy restau- Proposition 5 suggests that shortening the anticipation time may be welfare-increasing in some circumstances.
Many successful business models are based on shortening the time between planning and execution of con-9 If µ = 0, then both ∆ A and ∆ * are independent of c.
10 That when ∆ a = 0 is a local maximum then it is necessarily a global maximum is not trivial. For some parameter values, U initially decreases with ∆ a , then it reaches a local minimum, then it increases to a local maximum, and finally it decreases to zero. In the proof of Proposition 5 we show that this second local maximum produces less utility than U at ∆ a = 0. Surprise ending is a common element in many folktales, story jokes and advertising. J. Loewenstein et al. (2001) show that the repetition-break plot structure (plot structures using repetition among obviously similar items to establish a pattern, and then a final contrasting item that breaks with the pattern to generate surprise) is extremely engaging. Similarly in our framework, repetition creates adaptation/expectation, and the contrasting item provokes the surprise.
Coping with Negative Events
An upcoming negative event induces anxiety. Anticipating the negative experience, however, can help one endure the event and reduce total pain. The literature on coping identifies several ways in which people respond to upcoming stress (Carver et al., 1989) and it examines coping strategies for health-related events (Scheier & Carver, 1985; Carver et al., 1993) . Our current setup allows us to examine the effect that adaptation has on modifying the reference point, and reduce total disutility.
Suppose we lear we need to undergo surgery. We have certain flexibility regarding the calendar date of the surgery, e.g., any time within the next three months. In the context of the AR model, when shall we schedule the surgery? A second situation is the following. Suppose we need to tell some close one that he/she has to undergo some critical surgery. The critical surgery has already been scheduled in a month from now. When shall we tell this relative the news? Now, in one week, in two weeks, or a few days before the surgery? In both these examples the goal is to decide the optimal amount of anticipation before a negative event.
When the duration of anticipation can be increased without bounds, the AR model recommends anticipating the negative event for as long as possible.
Proposition 7 Assume A1-A5 and that τ f (τ) goes to zero as τ goes to infinity. If α > 0, then total disutility tends to zero (not necessarily in a monotonic way) as ∆ a goes to infinity. Hence, ∆ a = ∞ minimizes disutility.
In many instances, however, the duration of anticipation cannot be increased beyond some limit (e.g., a
surgery cannot be postponed indefinitely). Because disutility may not be monotonic in ∆ a , it is possible that the optimal duration of anticipation be shorter than the total time available to anticipate. Let ∆ be the longest possible In the AR model, the marginal benefits of such postponement is given by
Hence, the condition that ensures that anticipation is optimal, The AR model supports the notion that delaying a gratification may not be costly. This is consistent with Baumeister & Tierney (2011) , who argue that one of the few psychological strategies that help exercising selfcontrol without depleting the finite resource of willpower is delaying, rather than denying, immediate gratification.
Conclusions
In this paper, we propose the Anticipation Recall (AR) model that formally links the three components of total utility (i.e., utility from anticipation, event utility, it might be optimal setting high conceptual consumption at first (e.g., we may imagine that a vacation will be extraordinary three months prior to the departure date) and then lowering the level of conceptual consumption as the event draws nearer so that the event can still generate a final pleasant surprise (e.g., we imagine that the upcoming vacation will be just good enough the week before leaving). Optimally managing created expectations allows deriving some positive utility from anticipating the upcoming event, while at the same time leaving potential for positive surprise when the event occurs.
In the presence of uncertainty, people react more to the possibility of good/bad outcomes rather than the probability of those good/bad outcomes (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) . Our specification of conceptual consumption, driven by images of upcoming events, natu-rally captures this idea. Under event uncertainty, individuals may choose to imagine the peak moment of a vacation, derive anticipation utility from these thoughts, while at the same time holding realistic probabilities about the realization of the upcoming event.
The model has still room for more psychological realism. For example, research suggests that recall of past experiences might be driven by prior beliefs and distorted positive images of reality (Mitchell et al., 1997; Stangor & McMillan, 1992; Xu & Schwarz, 2009; Ross, 1989) .
For example, Ross (1989) In conclusion, we hope that our work is a step toward providing a more articulated model capturing the total utility associated with an event. Built on psychological principles and set in continuous time frame, the AR model predicts the temporal profiles of instant utility experienced before, during, and after a given event.
Appendix A Experimental Design Study 1. The U-shape of instant utility before the event Objective. Is the instant utility before the event Ushaped, as predicted by Proposition 1?
Method. Participants were 147 individuals in the Boston area who engaged in a series of unrelated lab studies. All respondents were asked to imagine that their best friend, or a member of the family, just told them that he/she was willing to organize a nice birthday party for them. Next, participants' excitement about the upcoming event was measured at three points in time. Specifically, participants were asked three questions: "How excited are you (today) about your birthday celebrations," "How excited do you think you will be "a month before" the birthday celebrations," and "How excited do you think you will be "the day prior" to the birthday celebrations."
Responses were measured on a 7-point scale ranging from (1) "not excited at all," to (7) "extremely excited." once a day per one week (i.e., seven times)?" Subsequently, memorability of both events was measured within-subjects. Participants were asked to rate on a scale from 1 to 7 the memorability of each of the two kisses experiences. The scale ranged from (1) "not memorable at all," to (7) "extremely memorable."
Results. Sixty-eight percent of respondents selected the kiss one time as the most memorable experience between the two (Chi-square = 18.2, p < 0.001). Moreover participants rated kissing the movie star only once as significantly more memorable than kissing the movie star once a day per one week (6.4 vs. 5.5, t = 6.6, p < 0.001).
In conclusion, results from this study confirm that, ceteris paribus, the memorability of a unique experience is higher when the event happens only once, rather than multiple times.
Study 3. The optimal duration of anticipation
Objective. First we sought to demonstrate that there is an ideal date to begin anticipating an upcoming event, depending on the specific event. Second, we wanted to document that such ideal date depends on the magnitude of the event.
Method. Participants were 155 individuals in the Boston area who participated in a series of unrelated lab studies. All respondents were told that they would be provided with a list of positive events and asked to read the following paragraph: "Imagine you can decide when to be told about each event. In other words, you can decide for how long you will be anticipating the event."
Given the nature of some events, participants were also told to ignore potential complications that might arise in the future: "There are no other issues or constraints and the event will happen in the anticipated day (e.g. events will not be sold out, there are no booking or reservation issues, some other obligation will not get on its way)".
The list included the 11 events listed in Table D2 .
[ Table 2 about here.] The order of events was randomized. Participants were asked "How long in advance would you ideally like to be told about each of the following events?" Responses were measured on the following 1-8 time scale:
(1) 1 year; (2) 9 months; (3) 6 months; (4) 3 months; (5) 1 month; (6) 2 weeks; (7) 1 week; (8) the day prior.
Results. We calculated average ratings and, using linear interpolation, the equivalent time in days. Ratings of ideal anticipation time were analyzed using one-way repeated-measures ANOVA. The overall model was significant (F(5.9, 868.8) = 444.4, p < .000) and pairedsamples t-tests between all the events revealed that the ideal anticipation time indicated by participants for each event was significantly different from all the other events (p < 0.001), with the only exception of the pair "Twoweek vacation" and "Wedding of a relative distant" (4.3 vs. 4.4, n.s.) . As seen in Table D2 , participants indicated "Wedding of your best friend" as the event that they wanted to start anticipating at the earliest date (3.1, equivalent to 6 months prior), followed respectively by "Two-week vacation" (4.4, 3 months). The events that participants wanted to anticipate for the shorter time were "Movie at home on DVD" (7.7, day prior), and "Eating ice cream" (7.9, day prior). Furthermore, the comparisons between events of similar nature, but different magnitude, revealed that participants clearly preferred anticipating earlier in time events of bigger magnitude. Specifically, participants expressed a preference for anticipating earlier the "Wedding of their best friend" rather than the "Wedding of a distant relative" (3.1 vs. 4 .4, t = 9.3, p < 0.001), a "Two-week vacation" rather than "A weekend vacation" (4.4 vs. 5.8, t = 16.5, p < 0.001), "Relaxing for one day at a Spa" rather than "Receiving a massage" (6.7 vs. 7.2, t = 7.5, p < 0.001), and finally "Dining at a restaurant" rather than "Eating an ice cream" (7.0 vs. 7.9, t = 14.7, p < 0.001).
One may still suspect that the longer time needed to make arrangements for a larger event (e.g., buying a dress for a wedding, arrange lodging for a vacation) leads to desire for longer periods of anticipation. Yet our results persist even for events requiring similar preparations (e.g., weddings of relatives or best friends).
Appendix B Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. We take derivatives of u(t) with respect to t to obtain
Instant (dis)utility increases iff π ≥ α/ρ a . By the concavity of π, π decreases with τ. This implies that u (t)
can change signs at most once. If π (0
Proof of Proposition 2. Use the definition of U A , the change of variable τ = ρ a (t b − t), and integration by parts, respectively, to obtain
For event,
For recall, apply the change of variable τ = ρ r (t − t e )
[dt = dτ/ρ r ] to obtain
Adding U A , U E , and U R yields the desired expression. 
then αΣ ≥ ρ a , (5) holds, and
Proof of Proposition 3. Use (4) to define k A , k E and k R as |U| A = |v(c)|k A , |U| E = |v(c)|k E , and |U| R = |v(c)|k R , respectively. In view of and (6), the derivative of the k A with respect to c is given by
One can easily show that k E = 0 and k R = µ|c| −1 k E . It follows that ck A /k A = µψ and ck R /k R = µ. For each utility component (A, E, or R), |c||U| /|U| = 1 + |c|k /k and the result follows. If π is concave and τπ (τ) is increasing, then
As |c| increases, ρ a goes to zero, ψ goes to zero, and the elasticity of |U| A goes to 1. If T is finite, then the same holds true for the elasticity of |U| E .
Proof of Proposition 5. Let g τ = e α ρa τ f (τ). To optimize U A wrt ∆ a , we use (6) to obtain
To find the optimal duration of anticipation, ∆ A , we set this expression equal to zero. This is equivalent to solving for G(∆ a ) = 0. We check that G(0) =
Next, we show that ∆ A decreases with α and ρ 0 , and increases with |c|. By the implicit function theorem, and knowing that ∂G/∂∆ a < 0, suffices to show that ∂G/∂α < 0, ∂G/∂ρ 0 < 0, and ∂G/∂|c| ≥ 0, respec-
13 To see the latter, note that
Note also that if −τπ /π < 1, then (π τ τ) = τπ + π > 0 and π τ τ is strictly increasing. Thus,
g τ π τ τdτ < 0, and
To maximize |U| wrt ∆ a , we use (4) and (7) to obtain
We argue that
As for uniqueness, we now show that if µ is not large, then U is strictly concave in ∆ a . Taking the second derivative of |U| and rearranging, we conclude that the sign of the second derivative is strictly negative iff
Thus, at µ = 0, (9) holds for all ∆ a ∈ [0, ∆ A ]. By continuity and the fact that the right hand side of (9) is bounded away from zero for all ∆ a , the inequality will be satisfied for all µ in some interval [0,μ). This implies |U| is strictly 
which implies that ∆ * = 0. The expression for ∆ A follows.
As for the optimal duration of anticipation, ∆ * , we first find the extremums of |U| by equating (8) Proof of Proposition 7. In view of (4), both |U| E and |U| R tend to zero as ∆ a increases. Remains to show that |U| A also goes to zero. Note that If ∂|U|/∂∆ a | ∆ a =0 = 0 then |U| decreases and we are in solution 3.
In view of Proposition 6, if ∂|U|/∂∆ a | ∆ a =0 < 0, then we may have zero or two extrema. Solution 2 corresponds to the case of two extrema, where (dis)utility decreases until reaching the first fixed point, increases until reaching the second fixed point, and decreases thereafter.
Solution 3 corresponds to the case of zero extremum, and (dis)utility (weakly) decreases with ∆ a . Figure C1 . When conceptual consumption is constant, effective consumption is decreasing during anticipation and the event, and constant during recall. Figure C2 . The temporal profiles of instant utility, u(t), for different levels of α (left) and ρ 0 (right). Base case assumptions: c = 1, ∆ a = 40, ∆ e = 10, α = 0.01, π(τ) = τ 0.5 , ρ 0 = 0.05 and µ = 2. Figure C3 . Utility of anticipation, of the event, and of recall as a function of c. [∆ a = 10, ∆ e = 5, α = 0.04, π(τ) = τ, ρ 0 = 0.1, and µ = 2]. Diminishing sensitivity to τ δ ∈ (0, 1]
